

Series II
Subjects Files,
1916-1973

Box 14, Folder 11

Correspondence,
Letters received,
1952

0311



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Rm ~~2515~~ 1534

IN REPLY REFER TO

CHK No. 34

4 Jan 1952

Capt. J.J. Rochefort, USN
U.S. Naval War College
Newport, R.I.

Dear Captain Rochefort:

I have just finished checking, compiling and typing the Sixth Base Air Force (and other) DesOpOrds translated by Mrs. T and am forwarding the material herewith. You will find a covering index which shows what 6FGB DesOpOrds are contained in the present translation, and also what DesOpOrds were contained in previous document translations already in your possession. We still have less than half of the 6FGB DesOpOrds for the period we are interested in, but I hope that at least we have the more important ones and that some of the missing ones will turn up as we pursue our research.

I now have Mrs. T going through the same series of documents again, this time to extract operations orders of other commands concerned with the air phase - i.e., Southwest Area Force, WLAB and W3AB. There is a remarkable lack of documents for 5FGB, for what reason I do not know. However, the Fifth was pretty much of a skeleton outfit by the time of the LEYTE battle, so I trust that this gap in the source material will not be too serious.

After we have finished extracting the operations orders and other useful battle reports, etc, from the communications logs of the various air unit war diaries and action reports, the question will arise as to how much more of the air material the Commodore will require and how he wants us to provide it to him. The action reports (sento shoho) of the air units are quite different from those of the surface forces in that, more often than not, they cover single attacks on one particular day rather than all combat operations of the unit during the whole SHO No. 1 Operation. So we have a whole slew of action reports for just one small unit, and needless to say, we will get hopelessly bogged down if we stick to our normal translating method. It would seem that, here at least, the Commodore would be wise to make an exception and let us extract and summarize the important facts from each action report. Very often, otherwise, we shall be translating pages of detailed stuff about a single attack mission involving a few aircraft of one Attack Unit, when the final result is that the damned planes went out and failed to contact anything. Of course, even when there was no contact, the essential facts regarding the sortie are necessary, but it seems to be that a summary would fill the bill quite adequately. I hope that you and the Commodore will give this some thought.

I received the Commodore's manuscript and covering letter after the Christmas interlude. I have already gone through it preliminarily, but

0312

due to the intervention of the New Year holiday and the fact that I wanted to get the 5FGB operations orders all checked, compiled, typed and sent off to you as soon as possible, I have not yet been able to draw up my comments on the manuscript. I shall start doing that right away and shall send the Commodore my comments as soon as I can get them in shape. It is a pity that this sort of thing cannot be done in direct discussion instead of by writing, for it would take much less time to get various intricate points straightened out.

If the Commodore is already back, I trust that he had a pleasant trip and that his Mother's health is improved. Assure him that I will get on with the writing up of my comments on his MSS just as fast as I can.

With best wishes to yourself and Commander Hartmann for a happy and successful New Year, I am,

Sincerely,

Clarke H. Kawakami
Clarke H. Kawakami

Incl.- 2 copies, Jap. document translation

0313



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

IN REPLY REFER TO

CHK No. 35

15 Jan 1952

Commodore R.W. Bates, USN
Naval War College
Newport, R.I.

Dear Commodore,

I received yesterday your letter of the 9th and am happy that you are amenable to my suggestion regarding our handling of the air material. I gather that you make the exception somewhat grudgingly, but I am sure that when we actually start carrying the suggestion out and provide you with some summaries, you will find the results quite satisfactory. Also, I don't think that you need worry about our failing to provide you with all items bearing on "command decisions". If they are in the documents, we'll give them to you. So far as the air unit detailed action reports are concerned, the summary method should enable us to give you precisely the facts you need in much more concise form and at a marked saving of our time.

With regard to your second point, we will make every effort to provide you first with all material bearing on the period prior to 17 Oct. However, as you can easily understand, it may sometimes be advisable to translate later material too, so that it will not be necessary to come back to the same documents repeatedly.

I have finished my comments on the first few sections of your MSS and am forwarding them to you herewith. I hope that you will find them of assistance to you. I shall meanwhile continue with the succeeding sections.

Best wishes to everyone.

Sincerely,

Clarke H. Kawakami
Clarke H. Kawakami

Incl. - pp 1-5 of MSS with comments

0314



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

IN REPLY REFER TO

CHK No. 36

25 Jan 1952

Commodore R. W. Bates, USN
U.S. Naval War College
Newport, R.I.

Dear Commodore,

Thank you very much indeed for your kind letter of the 17th. I sincerely appreciate your complimentary remarks, and I am most happy that my comments are proving helpful. I will check further on the matter of independent orders emanating from the Naval General Staff, though I am inclined to believe that they cannot be of an operational nature.

I am sending along herewith my comments on the next several pages of the MSS up to the section on "Information Available to the Japanese Commander". I think that we are over the toughest part now and that things will progress more easily and swiftly from here on.

Am in a hurry to get this off, so will close now. Best regards to you all.

Sincerely,

Clarke H. Kawakami
Clarke H. Kawakami

Incl. pp. 6-10 of MSS, and comments

0315



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

IN REPLY REFER TO

CHK NO. 37

30 Jan 1952

Commodore R. W. Bates, USN
U.S. Naval War College
Newport, R.I.

Dear Commodore,

Am forwarding herewith my comments on the next section of your manuscript concerning "Information Available to the Japanese Commander". Am continuing today with the section on deployment of the Japanese naval forces.

Incidentally, a couple of days ago, Roger's office came into possession of a recently-published Japanese booklet showing all the Japanese aircraft used in World War II. It is very useful in enabling us to identify aircraft which the Japanese documents generally refer to only by type-names such as TENZAN, SAIUN, etc. Using the booklet in conjunction with our own identification manual, we can come up with the type-names which we used - VAL, JUDY, etc. I checked on the "KI-67 new-type heavy bomber", which I referred to in my last batch of comments, and found that it was the "Betty Type-1 medium bomber". The Japanese also referred to it as "Type-IV heavy bomber" and HIRYU.

Best wishes.

Sincerely,

Clarke H. Kawakami
Clarke H. Kawakami

Incl. - pp. 11-19 of MSS, with comments

0316



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

IN REPLY REFER TO

PART VI - Jap Side

CHK No. 33

7 Feb 1952

Commodore R. W. Bates, USN
Naval War College
Newport, R.I.

Dear Commodore,

Am forwarding you herewith my comments on the next several pages of your manuscript, covering most of the section on deployment of the Japanese naval forces.

I discussed this section with Captain Rochefort during his visit here last week. He suggested that I leave it aside until he had an opportunity to talk it over with you further, but I thought that it would be just as well for me to go ahead and write up my comments on it as it stands, so that you will have them before you when you consider revising it. They may possibly be of somehelp.

I was going to send along, with this, a translation of some Mobile Force orders pertinent to the subject of the allocations. However, I think that it would be wise if I extended the translation to cover additional orders essential to your development of the background, not limiting them just to the Mobile Force. I will get on this immediately, before continuing with my comments on the remaining portion of the manuscript.

Best wishes to you all.

Sincerely,

Clarke E. Kawakami

Incl. - pp. 20-26 of MSS, with comments attached

(See Comments by MRK
7-1-52)

0317



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

IN REPLY REFER TO

CHK NO. 39

February 13, 1952

Commodore R. W. Bates, USN
Naval War College
Newport, R.I.

Dear Commodore:

Am forwarding you herewith translations of quite a number of orders and dispatches (principally Combined Fleet and Mobile Force) pertinent to the background portion of your study up to 17 Oct. I would suggest that, when your yeoman proceeds to type them up, he follow the method and format which I employed for the 6265 DesOpOrds, listing all the sources at the beginning and then giving only the appropriate source number for each order or dispatch. I have drawn up the list of sources on the cover sheets and marked the source numbers on each separate dispatch. I have also arranged the whole business in chronological order rather than by command, since I think that this gives a much clearer picture of how things developed. Incidentally, tell Captain Rochefort that the translation includes those messages which he marked for translation in the document he returned to us, provided they fell in the period up to and including 17 Oct. The others we are leaving until later.

You will find in the translation the Mobile Force orders to which I made specific reference in my last comments, and bearing on the matter of the allocation of forces. These orders are all that I could find for this command bearing on this subject, in the documents presently available to us.

There are a number of very interesting dispatches in the translation, in particular, C/S Combined Fleet Dispatch 101512, 10 Oct; C/S SW Area Fleet Dispatch 101554, 10 Oct; Imp GHQ Navy Sec Dispatch 111255, 11 Oct; and C/S Combined Fleet Dispatch 170946, 17 Oct. C/S Combined Fleet Dispatch 181110, 18 Oct, is also a very important one, though it falls outside the background period.

I strongly get the impression from the dispatches relative to the TAIWAN air action that Combined Fleet did at the time believe that the base air forces were sinking our carriers right and left, though the tone becomes somewhat less exuberant subsequent to 15 Oct. I wouldn't in any event accept at face value post-surrender assertions by Japanese officers to the effect that they from the first doubted the veracity of the air force claims. I don't think that they really saw the light until it was too late, that is, until we began landing on LEYTE.

Sincerely,

Clarke H. Kawakami
Clarke H. Kawakami

Inc - Translation (See folder CHK# 39)

0318



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

IN REPLY REFER TO

CHK NO. 40

18 Feb 1952

Commodore R. W. Bates, USN
Naval War College
Newport, R.I.

Dear Commodore:

Am forwarding herewith a few more translated Combined Fleet orders. Two of them were already given in Capt SHIBATA'S diary, but I thought it best to take them from communications logs in the actual war diaries, so that you can see exactly to whom they were addressed, etc. You will note that Combined Fleet DesOpOrd No. 331, 0925 10 Oct (SHO 2 alert for the base air forces) was sent info to SHINCHIKU Base, where Toyoda was. This has a bearing on the question you pose in your letter of the 15th, received this morning. I shall be ready to discuss this matter when you phone tomorrow morning. Capt Rochefort is correct in saying that the DesOpOrds were all issued from Combined Fleet headquarters at HIYOSHI, and the Special DesOpOrds from TOYODA on Taiwan. However, he is not right in assuming that C/S Combined Fleet could issue any DesOpOrds in the name of CinC Combined Fleet without referring them to TOYODA. This would have created quite an impossible situation, as you can easily imagine. I believe the answer is simply that C/S Combined Fleet issued most of the DesOpOrds from HIYOSHI upon TOYODA'S instructions, with the possible exception of the initial alert order.

I am also studying your letter of the 14th indicating the particular matters on which you need further data. We shall be able to provide you with quite bit of piecemeal data concerning the results claimed by Japanese air units in attacks on Halsey's forces. We also will do our best on the subject of Japanese air losses, but as I have frequently pointed out, there is inadequate source material to enable us to come up with any overall figures which we can be reasonably sure are complete.

With regard to the 6FGB material which Capt Rochefort brought down here, I have been so busy with my comments on your MSS and with the background stuff that I have not yet been able to go through it. I shall do so as soon as I get clear of some more of the background orders we have translated for various commands, mainly air, and I can then see how much of the material needs to be translated for the background phase. Obviously, now that the heat is on, we must be careful to direct our translating effort where it is most vitally needed. We can't do everything at once.

Sincerely,

Clarke H. Kawakami
Clarke H. Kawakami

Incl - translation

(Incl Put in Orange Folder marked CHK#40)

0319



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

IN REPLY REFER TO

CHK NO. 42

3 Mar 1952

Captain J. J. Rochefort, USN
Naval War College
Newport, R.I.

Dear Capt. Rochefort,

I received this morning your note of 28 Feb asking me to send you the War Diary of the Mobile Force for Oct 1944. The only document approximating this is War Diary First Mobile Fleet, 1 Mar - 15 Nov 1944, which contains very little useful information in it and which doesn't answer the questions you are concerned with. I translated all the relevant entries in this document long ago, but they were of such minor importance that I neglected sending them up to Newport. I shall type them up later this week and send them along, but they won't give you much additional data.

Since the document in question doesn't answer your questions, I researched around to see if I could find the answers for you. The Mobile Fleet War Diary does indicate that 653 Air Gp headquarters was at OITA Air Base on 10 Oct, but I have no documents showing whether all the Group's flying units were there or not. 601 Air Gp War Diary, Oct 1944, WDC 160295, NA 12535, indicates that the hq and most of this air gp were at MATSUYAMA Air Base, with a part at MIYAZAKI. We don't have 634 Air Gp war diary for October, but the War Diary for September (also contained in WDC 160295, NA 12535) indicates that the carrier bomber unit was then training at IWAKUNI, the seaplane bomber unit at KURE, the fighters at TOKUNAGA, and the TENZAN unit at No. 2 MIHO. Where the hq was I can't determine. *SHIMA*

As for the carriers, War Diary ZUIHO, Oct 1944 (WDC 161636, NA.11973) indicates that this carrier was at OITA on the 10th. CHITOSE and ZUIKAKU were at KURE (War Diary CHITOSE, Oct 1944 and War Diary ZUIKAKU, Oct 1944; also WDC 161636, NA 11973). There are no war diaries for the other carriers, unfortunately. I will check in the Tabular Records and see if I can find anything there for CHIYODA. Do you also want the location of AMAGI and UNRYU (Cardiv 1)? Judging from C/S Fifth Fleet Dispatch 102102 (10 Oct) to Com KURE Nav Dist (already translated and sent up to you), it would appear that ISE and HYUGA were at KURE on 10 Oct.

I have the Commodore's query as to why we want 4 copies of translations down here. I was under the impression that I told you long ago what we did with the 4 copies down here - 2 to Roger, 1 for Mrs. T and 1 for me. If economy is vital, I daresay Mrs T and I could get along with one between us. However, I do think it wise for us to have one extra copy that we can spare in case you should ever lose one up there. More about this in another letter. I am feeling miserable with an incipient 'flu and am going home to bed.

Sincerely,
CHK

Charles H. Keweleme

0320



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

IN REPLY REFER TO

CHK No. 41

28 Feb 1952

Commodore R. W. Bates, USN
Naval War College
Newport, R.I.

Dear Commodore,

Your letter of the 26th came this morning, and it is encouraging to learn that our efforts are being appreciated up there.

Re your query on the physical location of Comdr Mobile Force on 10 Oct, the answer is that he was flying his flag at the headquarters of the 653rd Air Gp at OITA Air Base. He was there until 18 Oct when he transferred his flag to ZUIKAKU in preparation for the sortie of the Main Body. As the source for this, you may cite War Diary First Mobile Fleet, 1 March - 15 November 1944, WDC 160341, NA 11404.

Re your request for further search data on KAKOYA searches for 12-17 Oct, I sent off yesterday a couple of translations of 11th Recce Unit ("T" Force) search reports covering searches by that unit on 13 and 17 Oct. I do not doubt that there were additional searches by aircraft of other units, but unhappily we have no other documents. I presume that, from the 6FGB and other air orders that we have translated, you do know pretty well what searches were ordered, even though we may not have any confirmation that they were all carried out. If I should be able to discover any additional scraps of information on the subject, I will send them on promptly.

Sincerely,

Clarke H. Kawakami
Clarke H. Kawakami

0321

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Commodore R. W. Bates, USN

DATE: 7 Mar 1952

FROM : Kawakami

SUBJECT:

Herewith a couple more translations of air unit action reports (708th Attack Unit) and also an already typed translation of the pertinent portion of the First Mobile Fleet War Diary, which I told Capt. Rochefort in my recent letter to him I would send along shortly. He will see that the document is of relatively little usefulness, though it does contain a few interesting facts - such as the entry indicating that CARDIV 3, in early October, was preparing to move to SINGAPORE. You can use this in your background discussion where you said that CinC Combined Fleet and Comdr Mobile Force planned to reconcentrate or reunite the carrier force and the main fleet striking force (IIB) in the SINGAPORE area in November. I believe you cited an USSBS interrogation as a source for this. Here is confirmation in an original wartime document.

Received your query of the 4th yesterday p.m. and am getting on it immediately.

Sincerely,

See CHK (3/7/52) "4/ + #2"

CHK

0322

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Commodore R. W. Bates

DATE: 5 Mar 52

FROM : Kawakami

SUBJECT:

Herewith a couple more translations of action reports for units of the 653rd Air Gp (CARDIV 3) which took part in the TAIWAN air operations, 14-21 Oct. These reports are bothersome in that the action summary sections don't give any times, courses or positions. In case of the 263rd Attack Unit report, this deficiency was remedied somewhat by the appendage of charts covering a majority of the search and attack missions and giving times of departure and courses, etc. The 166th Fighter Unit report had no charts of this nature.

You can see from these reports what a lot of work is required to obtain so meager useful information. It seems like a lot of wasted effort.

CHK

P.S. How is Hartman doing? I wish he would give me just a little teeny inkling of what he wants, and what he doesn't want - especially the latter.

(see CHK 3/5/52)

0323

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Commodore R. W. Bates

DATE: 3 Mar 52

FROM : Kawakami

SUBJECT:

Herewith translations of action reports of the fighter detachments of the 254th and 256th Air Gps (China) which were transferred to TAIWAN and operated under command of 14th Combined Air Gp.

We have a few more action reports covering the TAIWAN air battle (708th Attack Unit and 166th Fighter Unit), but that will be everything. Hope to get these off during the week. After that, we will scrape the barrel to see if there are any useful scraps of information that we missed, but I'm afraid that we have turned up just about all there is.

Sincerely,

CHK

(CHAR 3/3/52)

0324

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Commodore R. W. Bates, USN

DATE: 29 Feb 52

FROM : Kawakami

(#2)

SUBJECT:

Herewith some more miscellaneous air orders, principally bearing on the shift of 12AF (2FGB) and 3AF (7FGB) units down to the KYUSHU area. They should help Hartman to ascertain just what was where on a certain date.

A few more 6FGB DesOpOrds are included. I would have done them earlier, but I thought Mrs. T had already translated them.

There are a few WLAB search orders here, too, which should help to fill the gaps in the "Q" Sector search picture.

(See CHK #2-29-52
#2)

Sincerely,

CHK

PS - Don't know whether Mrs T can stand the strain much longer. I am giving her a rough time.

0325

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Commodore Bates

DATE: 29 Feb 1952

FROM : Kawakami

(#1)

SUBJECT:

Herewith a couple more brief translations pertinent to the air operations during the preliminary period. The full 51st Air Fleet order for the "general attack" of 14 Oct should be helpful. Together with the WLAB battle reports covering the attack operations of that date, you should have a pretty good picture of what happened on 14 Oct anyway.

The merit report for the 14th Combined Air Gp isn't too helpful, but you can pick up a few scraps of useful information here and there. A little more on the 14 cfg will be sent along shortly in translations of action reports of the fighter detachments of the 254 and 256 Air Gps (from China) which operated on Formosa under 14cfg command, largely as fighter interception units.

Sincerely,

CHK

(See CHK #1 2/29/52)

0326

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Commodore R. W. Bates

DATE: 27 Feb 1952

FROM : Kawakami

SUBJECT:

Herewith translations of some more air orders, etc. for the background phase. These are on the next level below 6FGB and are for 51st Air Flot, which commanded Western Attack Force 1 (WLAB). I think Comdr Hartman will find them useful.

I would like to call your attention in particular to the WLAB Battle Reports included herein. They will provide you with some data on Japanese claims and losses in some of the air actions off Formosa. It is too bad we don't have similar battle reports for all the other Attack Forces. We did have some for W2AB in the 25th Air Flot document, already translated.

Hope you are satisfied with the flow of material. We are knocking ourselves out down here.

(See CHK 2-27-52)
FOR TRANSLATIONS

CHK

0327

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Commodore Bates (Att'n Comdr Hartmann)

DATE: 25 Feb 1957 ⁽²⁾

FROM : Kawakami

SUBJECT:

Herewith a few search reports of the 11th Recce Unit ("T" Force) for 13, 17 and 18 Oct. Also an action report of the 703rd Attack Unit (also "T" Force) on a night attack 13 Oct, in which a cruiser was reported sunk and a battleship damaged (and probably sunk).

Despite the fact that duplicatory or unessential portions have been omitted from translations in these reports, they are good examples of how much wasted effort ~~there is~~ results from the exact-translation method. The essential facts can be extracted from such individual action reports and given to you in brief, concise form. I propose to do this from now on for the air action reports, since that is the only way we will be able to cover all the material on the background phase in time. I wish that Comdr Hartman would be so good as to jot down exactly what facts he wants. I of course have a good idea, but I would like him to define his minimum requirements. That will eliminate any doubt.

Sincerely,

CHK

(See CHK 2-25-52)
for translations

0328



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF NAVAL RECORDS AND HISTORY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

IN REPLY REFER TO

11 March 1952

Dear Captain,

The ships you ask about in your letter of 6 March are listed below with types and tonnage indicated:

YUHO MARU	(AO)	5226
HAKKO MARU	(AO)	10488 est.
OMUROSAN MARU	(AO)	9204
ITSUKUSHIMA MARU	(AO)	10006
MANEI MARU	(AO)	5226
NIPPO MARU	(AO)	10000 est.
CHIBURI	(PF)	940
YURIJIMA	(Mc)	720
NICHIEI MARU	(AO)	10020
RYOEI MARU	(AO)	10016
KURAHASHI	(PF)	940

Sources for this information the "hefty tome" from PSIS, and Japanese Naval Vessels At the End of the War, compiled by Shizuo Fukui, 25 April 1947, Administrative Division, Second Demobilization Bureau.

My respects to Commodore Bates and Commander Hartman.

As always,

Roger

Roger Pineau
CNO, Op-291

Captain J. J. Rochefort, USN
Naval War College
Newport, R. I.

0329



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

IN REPLY REFER TO

CHK NO. 43

4 March 1952

Commodore R. W. Bates, USN
Naval War College
Newport, R.I.

Dear Commodore,

Received your two separate memos yesterday. The one patting us on the back for our labor was highly appreciated. The other questioning me on the disposition of the 4 copies of translations we receive came as quite a surprise, as I already indicated briefly in my letter to Capt. Rochefort yesterday. Your phrase "more by rumor than by fact" is especially baffling, and you will pardon me if I frankly tell you that I resent it. I have never been very good about dissembling my feelings, as you perhaps have discerned by now.

I am surprised at your surprise because I am sure that, on one of Captain Rochefort's earlier visits when we discussed the typing of our translations up at Newport, I informed him what we do with the 4 typed copies of translations. As I recall, Rochefort saw nothing unreasonable about it at the time. I naturally assumed that you thereafter knew about it too, and that you had no objection.

As I said in my letter to Rochefort yesterday, if economy is a vital consideration, Mrs. T and I can do with one copy between us now that we are working in the same room - though I still feel that it is wise to have one extra copy on hand just in case. (The extra labor required to produce this one extra copy is far less than the labor involved in retyping a whole translation should a copy ever get lost and have to be replaced.)

As for the two copies which go to Roger, it is exactly the same thing as for the two which go to you. One is for Adm Morison to mutilate, dismember and annotate as he will. The other is for preservation intact in the Office of Naval Records. Actually, none of the translations have gone to Morison yet. Roger merely arranges them in convenient order and files them away until such time as Morison gets around to working on the volume in which the Leyte battle will fall. When that will be I don't know.

Well, that about covers it, I think. Now I want to get down to something more productive.

Sincerely,

Clarke H. Kawakami
Clarke H. Kawakami

0330

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Commodore R. W. Bates, USN
Att'n Comdr Hartman

FROM : Kawakami

DATE: 19 March

SUBJECT:

Herewith a few of the additional 6FGB items from the Tokyo Historical Section microfilm.

The Item numbers are mine, merely to designate ~~separate~~ individual parts of the microfilm which we are extracting.

Other Items will follow, and you can simply append them to the accompanying translations, as they will all be from the same source.

→ Hartman will find some figures on naval air strength in the TAIWAN and NANSEI Shoto areas in this material.

CHK

See:
(CHK # 3/19/52) -

0331

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Commodore R. W. Bates

DATE: 18 March

FROM : Kawakami

SUBJECT:

Herewith a few more miscellaneous translations to fill in gaps in the background, principally with respect to the exact physical location of various units and ships, and their movements up to 17 Oct. I have now given you everything there is of this nature covering the surface forces in the homeland. Mrs. T is presently translating similar material for units of 1YB (BATDIV 1, CRUDIVS 7 & 5, DESRON 10), and this will be forwarded shortly. Movements of CRUDIV 16 are covered in one of the translations forwarded herewith.

I have now had a chance to look over the remaining 6FGB material contained on the Tokyo microfilm, and there is some of it which I think will be helpful to Comdr Hartman. So I am shifting back to the air side and will get this material off as rapidly as possible.

I sent off yesterday the document which Capt Rochefort desired. I think that it should be gone through once more with a view to picking up what remaining dispatches of value there may be in them. If Rochefort will mark anything he feels might be useful, we will translate it upon the return of the document.

(See CHK 3/19/52 - #1, #2, #3, #4, #5, #6, #7, #8, #9, #10, #11, #12, #13, #14, #15, #16, #17, #18, #19, #20, #21, #22, #23, #24, #25, #26, #27, #28, #29, #30, #31, #32, #33, #34, #35, #36, #37, #38, #39, #40, #41, #42, #43, #44, #45, #46, #47, #48, #49, #50, #51, #52, #53, #54, #55, #56, #57, #58, #59, #60, #61, #62, #63, #64, #65, #66, #67, #68, #69, #70, #71, #72, #73, #74, #75, #76, #77, #78, #79, #80, #81, #82, #83, #84, #85, #86, #87, #88, #89, #90, #91, #92, #93, #94, #95, #96, #97, #98, #99, #100, #101, #102, #103, #104, #105, #106, #107, #108, #109, #110, #111, #112, #113, #114, #115, #116, #117, #118, #119, #120, #121, #122, #123, #124, #125, #126, #127, #128, #129, #130, #131, #132, #133, #134, #135, #136, #137, #138, #139, #140, #141, #142, #143, #144, #145, #146, #147, #148, #149, #150, #151, #152, #153, #154, #155, #156, #157, #158, #159, #160, #161, #162, #163, #164, #165, #166, #167, #168, #169, #170, #171, #172, #173, #174, #175, #176, #177, #178, #179, #180, #181, 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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Capt J. J. Rochefert

DATE: 12 Mar 52

FROM : Kawakami

SUBJECT:

Herewith translations of the typed material from Tokyo. We did everything with the exception of the two items (12 and 13) indicated on the covering list.

I am keeping the Japanese originals here for the time being, since there is a chance that I may be able to identify some of the floating appendices. I will return them to you later, together with the microfilm, if you wish to store them up there.

Have now obtained a blow-up of the microfilm and will see if there is anything worth translating. Do you think you might have use for the appended deployment tables to 6FGB 2m OpOrd No. 6?

What will the Commodore need on IYB for the background period up to 17 Oct?

(Contained in CHK 3/12/52)

CHK

0333

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Capt . J.J. Rochefort

DATE: 11 Mar 52

FROM : Kawakami

SUBJECT: Correction

In my letter of 3 Mar, I wrote that the 634 Air Gp fighters were training at TOKUYAMA. This should have been TOKUSHIMA. (These names crop up frequently, and it is hard to keep them straight.)

The attached material which I have gathered in answer to the Commodore's query regarding the DD sent to help move the 653 and 634 Air Gps also helps to clear up the answers to your questions on the location of these Air Gps as of 10 Oct.

1. 634 Air Gp: part at TOKUSHIMA, part at IWAKUNI (hq undoubtedly at one of these two, but which I don't know)
2. 653 Air Gp: OITA Base

CHK

(See CHK 3-11-52)

0334

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Commodore R. W. Bates, USN

DATE: 11 Mar 52

FROM : Kawakami

SUBJECT:

Your query on the destroyers proved a lot more difficult to get the answers on than I anticipated. However, I've done the best I could and written everything up, including source translations and all.

I anticipated seeing you by this time and thought I could hand the stuff over to you here, but since you haven't turned up as yet, and may have come and gone without having the time to drop in here, I think I had best send the material on to Newport without further delay.

I will, however, keep your manuscript here a while longer just in case you should come after all. Then, I shall be able to discuss it with you here. I of course have kept a copy of my report and the accompanying translations, except the DESRON 11 and DESRON 10 Tables of Movements which I am forwarding in pencil MSS to be typed up there.

(See CHK 3/11/52)

Sincerely,
CHK

0335

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Commodore R. W. Bates, USN
 FROM : Kawakami Att'n Comdr Hartman

DATE: 24 Mar 52

SUBJECT:

Herewith the remaining items from the Tokyo microfilm of 6FGB material. Item IV contains the appended deployment tables of 6FGB OpOrd No. 6, with the exception of two tables which we thought weren't worth translating - the covering sheet explains which tables we didn't do. If you want to have them, please let us know, and we'll do them. Item V contains material extracted from 6FGB OpOrd No. 12 re tactical organization and methods. This order is a very lengthy document, but in going through it I couldn't see that it would be of much use to Comdr Hartman. I thought the tables showing the search and attack organizations might possibly be of some use, so we did these - and also the brief table summarizing the various tactical methods.

We are presently going through the air documents to see if we can ferret out any remaining scraps of material that might be useful for the background phase.

Sincerely,

CHK

(appendix 2 and 3
 being photostated)
 (see folder
 marked CHK 3/24/52)

0336

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
MILITARY HISTORY SECTION, SPECIAL STAFF

Description of Microfilm

Records of Operational Orders for Sho Operations

Issued by Commander, Sixth Air Force (Second Air Fleet)

These orders are copies of Sixth Air Force Operational Orders sent by cable:

Orders Nos (25) (9 Oct 44), 26 (10 Oct 44), 28-32 incl. (10 Oct 44), 33, (34), 35 & 37 (11 Oct 44), 38-43 incl. (12 Oct 44), (44-47) incl. (13 Oct 44), (49-54) incl. (14 Oct 44), 55-62 incl. (15 Oct 44), (63), 65, 67 & (69) (16 Oct 44), (71) (17 Oct 44), (78) & (79) (18 Oct 44).

Records of Operational Orders for Sho Operations

Issued by Commander, Sixth Air Force (Second Air Fleet)

Sixth Base Air Force Top Secret Operational Orders Nos 2 (16 Aug 44), 6 (5 Sep 44), 7 (26 Aug 44), 12 (23 Sep 44) and 13 (27 Sep 44).

Records of Special Attack Unit First Combined Base Air Force Top Secret Orders Nos 1, 2, & 3, 27 - 28 Oct 1944.

Note: These orders were acquired by the Liquidation Division, Second Demobilization Bureau, Tokyo from former Navy Captain Shibata, Bunzo, Senior Staff Officer, Second Air Fleet.

0337

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Commodore R. W. Bates

DATE: 26 Mar 52

FROM : Kawakami

SUBJECT:

Herewith some more air unit war diary material which may be useful in following the movements of air strength to TAIWAN and the PHILIPPINES, and the numbers of aircraft involved.

CHK

A
(See CHK 3/26/52 #1, #2, #3, #4, #5, #6, #7, #8)

0338

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Commodore R. W. Bates

DATE: 27 Mar 52

FROM : Kawakami

SUBJECT:

Herewith translation of a little item which I ran across on one of the microfilms from Tokyo which I borrowed from Army Hist Div. Because of your emphasis on probing the minds of the commanders, I think that you will find it highly interesting and valuable. It gives a pretty good picture of what Admiral Ozawa and his staff were thinking with respect to the SHO plan and the capabilities of the surface forces in their existing condition. It also gives a more concrete picture of Ozawa's ideas with respect to the shifting of carrier strength south to strengthen IYB. Apparently he had in mind sending only CARDIV 3, which would be ready first. CARDIVs 1 and 4 would remain with the homeland portion of the fleet, the ultimate ~~final~~ goal being to create two strong mobile forces, each with directly supporting carrier air strength, which would hit the enemy from north and south.

In this connection, I recall that you said in your manuscript that CinC Combined Fleet and Commander Mobile Force planned to reunite the surface

(See Folder CHK 3/27/52)



0339

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE:

FROM :

-2-

SUBJECT:

combat forces (Second Fleet) and the carrier forces (Third Fleet) in the Singapore area in November. This will require some revision in the light of the new document. As pointed out above, it would appear that Ozawa did not consider feasible a complete unification of the fleet in the southern area even though SHO 1 was recognized as the greatest probability. He apparently preferred having two striking forces with carrier air, one in the south and one in the north. This may have been because SHO 2 and 3 also had to be considered.

From the fact that Combined Fleet did carry out some of the recommendations contained in this memorandum, it would appear that Toyoda was prepared to act in accordance with Ozawa's views generally. However, the whole plan was thrown overboard by the half-assed and impulsive decision to activate SHO for the base air forces (including the carrier air units) on 12 Oct.

I received yesterday Toyoda's book with your request for a translation of certain pages. I was already familiar with this volume, having examined it in

0340

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE:

FROM :

- 3 -

SUBJECT:

Tokyo. My estimation of it was and is that it is of little value as a source, since Toyoda appears to be writing too much on the basis of hindsight and also seems to be attempting to pass the buck for some highly questionable decisions. I hope, therefore, that you will take it with a goodly dose of salt (Epsom preferably).

In the letter from Tokyo, I detect the fine hand of Capt. OHMAE and company. (OHMAE is very close to TOYODA and quite possibly consulted him as to what answer he should give to your queries.) As you will see when you get the translation of TOYODA's book, the answers in the letter - though supposedly based on the book - go beyond what appears there. I presume the residue was in Takata's statement.

Will try to get the translation done quickly, but there is a lot of extraneous stuff in these five pages. It could be summed up in a paragraph.

CEK

0341



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF NAVAL RECORDS AND HISTORY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

IN REPLY REFER TO

CHK NO. 44

1 Apr 1952

Commodore R. W. Bates, USN
Naval War College
Newport, R.I.

Dear Commodore:

I have just finished typing up the translations of all data I could locate pertinent to the queries put in your and Capt Rochefort's letters of 26 March. This material is forwarded herewith. My own analysis follows:

First of all, it is necessary to agree on what portion of the carrier air units Comdr Mobile Force, OZAMA, was ordered to transfer to 6FGB for shore-based operations. The Combined Fleet order specified "all aircraft of CARDIVS 3 and 4 capable of shore-based operations" - or perhaps a more exact translation would be "the full strength of CARDIVS 3 and 4 capable of shore-based operations". (With regard to Capt. Rochefort's point concerning the parenthetical KO-SE-NA, which we disregarded because it appeared to be a garble in the message, I really don't think that it changes the meaning any even if translated "if navigable". The only document in which this message appeared was the ZUIKAKU War Diary, so that it was impossible to check it against other texts to see if the KO-SE-NA was a garble or not. "KO SEBA", incidentally, is a rather doubtful way of saying "if navigable", as Rochefort suggests. It just ain't Japanese.)

In any case, I think that the order simply meant that Comdr Mobile Force was to make available for shore-based operations all ~~portion~~ the strength of the 653rd and 634th Air Gps that was currently operable. The only limiting factor, I should think, was the number of flying personnel ready for combat operations of any kind. Practically all of the 653rd Air Gp's fliers should have been available, while the percentage for the 634th may have been slightly less since its training wasn't as far advanced as that of the 653rd.

Fortunately, I was able to find strength figures for the 653rd Air Gp as of 1 Oct (see Translation 1). These show that the total number of operational aircraft of combat types on that date was 103 - 67 Zeros, 33 TENZAN and 3 SUISHI. This number may have increased slightly by 10 or 12 Oct, but assuming that it was constant, Comdr Mobile Force on 12 Oct released to 6FGB for shore-based operations 83 out of 103 operational aircraft. That is better than 80% for this air group. The bulk of the 20% he held back consisted of fighters.

For the 634th Air Gp, as you already know, there are no documents whatsoever. The only figures that we have are (1) the authorized complement figures as of 15 Aug (see Translation 4) and (2) the strength figures as of 15 Sept 1944 given on ~~the~~ one of the tables included in the 6FGB material obtained from Tokyo. How reliable the latter figures are I don't

(see folders marked CHK #44 -#1, #2, #3 & #4 for translations.)

0342

know, there appears to be something screwed up in the figures since the total of the operational aircraft of the various types shown in the columns of the table comes to 101 instead of 71 as shown in the total column. Since these are the only figures we have for 634, I guess we have no choice but to use them. By 12 Oct, there may have been some increase, but if we use the same figure - 101 - Comdr Mobile Force released to 6FGB for shore-based operations 71 out of 101, or a little better than 70% of the operational strength of this air group. This appears reasonable in comparison with the 80% ratio for the 653rd, because of the difference in the training level of the two air groups. Again, using the 15 Sept figures given in the table referred to above, it appears that the 30% withheld consisted mainly of fighters.

Combining the two air groups, you have Comdr Mobile Force releasing to 6FGB for shore-based operations 154 out of a total of 204 operational aircraft in these two groups. That's about 75%. As to why the other 25% was held back, I'm afraid that your guess is as good as mine. There is nothing in the available documents.

One point you appear to have overlooked in your discussion is that there was also the 601st Air Gp (CARDIV 1). This was the least ready of the three air groups of THIRD FLEET, which explains why Comdr Mobile Force on 12 Oct was ordered to transfer aircraft only from CARDIVS 3 and 4 for shore-based operations. The 601st, on 1 Oct, had 57 operational aircraft of combat types, with 34 more under repair or overhauling. (See Translation 2) On 17 Oct, when OZAWA was scraping together what was left of his carrier air units for the sortie of the Mobile Force Main Body, the 601st was ordered to send all its planes capable of carrier operations to be accommodated in CARDIV 3 along with the remnants of the 653rd and 634th. The 601st sent 27 planes (see Translation 2), out of the total of 116 which were aboard CARDIV 3 when it sortied 20 October (see Translation 3). The rest must have come from the aircraft withheld on 12 Oct by the 653rd and 634th Air Gps and such planes of these two groups as had been released to 6FGB on 12 Oct but were still in the KYUSHU area on the 17th. (Please note that Combined Fleet DesOpOrd 355, 17 Oct, ordered all CARDIV 3 main units remaining in the homeland to be restored to CARDIV 3. Presumably the same thing was done with CARDIV 4 aircraft which were still in KYUSHU.)

The figure of 110 planes, which OZAWA said in his interrogation remained after he had released 150 to 6FGB, includes aircraft of the 601st Air Gp. Hence, you are wrong in adding these two figures to arrive at the original strength of the 653rd and 634th. As indicated earlier, these two groups had a combined total of about 204 operational aircraft. The 601st had 57 operational planes, making a grand total of about 260 for all of THIRD Fleet.

I note that OZAWA's interrogation implies that he never got back any of the 150 planes which he says he was obliged to hand over to 6FGB for shore-based operations. It seems, however, that this was not the case, and that on 17 Oct he did get back what 653 and 634 Air Gp planes, transferred earlier, still remained in the KYUSHU area. On 14 Oct, there were a total of 60 planes of the 653rd Air Gp on OKINAWA and TAIWAN (this so)^{unc} has not

0343

yet been translated and sent to you). Assuming that no more advanced from the KYUSHU bases between the 14th and 17th, that would leave about 23 of the 653 Air Gp planes released to 6FEB on 12 Oct still in the KYUSHU area on the 17th. Add these to the 20 planes originally withheld, and you arrive at an available operational strength of about 43 planes for 653 Air Gp on 17 Oct in the homeland. Further, assuming that all these 43 planes were put aboard CARDIV 3 for the sortie, plus the 27 which Translation 2 indicates came from 601 Air Gp, that would leave 46 planes to come from the 634th. Probably these figures are off considerably, but anyway they are a rough indication of what happened.

With regard to your query concerning the complement of planes and types for each carrier, the best I can give you is the data contained in Translation 4. I have never seen any breakdown showing what were the complements for individual carriers.

As for your query (4), there is no question, it seems to me, that the aircraft of CARDIVS 3 and 4 which were not released on 12 Oct to 6FEB remained under Comdr Mobile Force (THIRD Fleet). There is nothing to indicate otherwise.

Well, I guess that is about all I have to offer on this subject. Hope that you can unscramble the mess somehow. Meanwhile, I will check once more to see if I can find any more clues.

Sincerely,


Clarke H. Kawakami

Incl. 4 translations, 2 copies each

2 pp. Manuscript

(b) Operations of Commander Mobile Force.

During the morning of the 12th Commander Mobile Force took no important action but awaited the results of the day's operations.

At about 1145 he received a dispatch from CinC, Combined Fleet which directed him to place all operational aircraft of Cardiv's THREE and FOUR under the operational command of Commander ^{*}SIXTH Base Air Force.

He therefore consulted with staff representatives of the SIXTH Base Air Force and arranged that Cardiv THREE aircraft (653rd Air Group) would be based at KAGO SHIMA and that Cardiv FOUR aircraft (634th Air Group) would be based at KANOYA, KOKUBU, ^{**}KAGO SHIMA and IBUSUKI.

He studied his availability reports and agreed to transfer (a) to KAGO SHIMA twenty-six Zero fighters, twenty-three fighter-bombers, twenty-nine Tenzan, five carrier attack planes; or a total of eighty-three planes of all types and (b) to KANOYA forty Zero fighters; to KOKUBU nine carrier bombers to KAGO SHIMA ten Tenzan and to IBUSUKI twelve seaplane bombers or a total of seventy-one planes of all types. This was a grand total of 154 planes. If the figures given by Commander Mobile Force in interrogation in 1945 are approximately correct there were a ^{***}

total of 260 planes in these two air groups. This would give

* CinC, Combined Fleet Dispatch 121110 October 1944 to Commander Mobile Force, ZUIKAKU War Diary October 1st-25th, 1944, WDC Document 161636 NA 11973.

** Senior Staff Officer SIXTH Base Air Force Dispatch 121536 October 1944 to Commander SIXTH Base Air Force, ZUIKAKU War Diary, October 1st-25th, 1944, WDC Document 161636 NA 11973.

***USSEBS Interrogation NAV No. 55 Interrogation of Japanese Officials, Interrogation of Vice Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa, IJN, Vol I, page 220.

an operational availability of 154/260 or about sixty-percent which, while low on American carrier standards, was a fair average for Japanese land-based planes at this time as evidenced by the records of the various Japanese air units during this operation.

He also issued instruction to his Commander SECOND Striking Force to assign two destroyers to assist in transferring the 634th Air Group. He issued no instructions this day concerning the 653rd Air Group but did so the following day.

What Commander Mobile Force thought of these preparations is nowhere stated. It seems clear however that he had not been consulted in the basic planning and it is also clear that he had not been consulted in these plans.

* Commander Mobile Force DesOpOrd 54, October 12th, 1944.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Commodore Bates, USN

DATE: 3 April 52

FROM : Kawakami

SUBJECT:

Herewith translation of another air document which I hoped might help you to follow the movements of the CARDIV 3 air units (653 Air Gp). Actually, I'm afraid it contains little new information outside of the "aircraft situation tables" which appear on pp. 2 and 5 of the translation. The first table clearly shows the distribution of 653 Air Gp planes which took part in the 14 Oct attack operations, after the attack. The second table, under date of 19 Oct, bears no explanation of what it represents, but I suppose that it is limited to 653 Air Gp strength on TAIWAN (DAIKOZAN Base).

I tried tying up these figures with those given in SHIBATA's diary for 653 Air Gp, but it ~~was a hopeless task~~ appears to be a futile effort to try and find any agreement between these different sources. I'm afraid Hartman will have to pull the figures out of his hat.

Will now get back to translating Toyoda's book.

(See CHK 4-3-52)

CHK

0347

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Capt J. J. Rochefert

DATE: 7 April 52

FROM : Kawakami

SUBJECT:

Received this morning your note asking for the return of one copy of the translation of Supplementary Material, 6FGB OpOrds re SHO Ops. I find that I have only the normal number of copies of the translation which bears this subject at the top and covers Items I-III, so I presume that it is not this one. I do have one too many copies of the second part of the translation - Items IV and V. So I am returning one copy of the latter herewith. The translation was not assembled properly, so I have reassembled it as it should be. Please do the same with the copy you retained up there.

Roger is leaving imminently for a 6-week junket to Tokyo. It will be possible for him to check into any particular questions which may be bothering you, of the sort that are not answered in the available documents. He'll be able to talk directly to Toyoda, Ozawa, Kurita and any other high-ranking officers who had to do with the SHO operations and are still available. Please send me a list of any specific things you'd like looked into on the spot. One worthwhile subject of investigation would be the submarine operations. Roger could check and see if any 6 Fleet officers are around, from whom he might be able to get some dope.

(See CHK #3-24-52)

CHK

0348

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Commodore R. W. Bates

DATE: 4 April 1952

FROM : Kawakami

SUBJECT:

Herewith the translation of the pertinent (?) pages from Toyoda's book. I repeat my earlier warning to you with regard to its reliability and, on Monday, will try to get off a letter containing some comments concerning a few points.

Glad you found the Mobile Fleet memorandum useful. I thought you would.

Tell Rochefort that I bow to his infallibility on the subject of Japanese jargon.

(See Folder Marked ^{CHK}4-4-52)

0349

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Commodore R. W. Bates, USN

DATE: 10 April 52

FROM : Kawakami

SUBJECT:

Herewith three translations of air documents. As you can see, we are going on into the air operations after the 18th, that is, during the LEYTE action proper. We have exhausted all material on the background phase.

The accompanying translations are all the material there is concerning the operations of the aircraft on CARDIV 3, outside of what may be contained in the reports for the carriers themselves. We will proceed with the latter.

CHK

CHK 4-10-52

0350

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Commodore R. W. Bates, USN

DATE: 14 Apr 52

FROM : Kawakami

SUBJECT:

Herewith translation of another brief air document, pertinent to the TAIWAN air battle. I previously thought that I would not bother with this one, since its contents appeared to duplicate the entries in the "Action of Other Units" columns of the 166th Fighter Unit and 263rd Attack Unit detailed action reports, 14-21 Oct. However, it may be well for you to have this one too, if only to check against the other two. This really does finish up everything we have covering air operations up to the 17th.

Saw Roger off at the MATS terminal this morning and wished that I were heading for Tokyo myself. Can't you wangle me a free ride out there sometime? I gave Roger several pages of stuff to ask Capt. Ohmae about, including the matter of whose original bright idea it was to use the carrier air units for land-based operations, and exactly what percentages of CARDIV 3 and 4 operational aircraft were turned over by OZAWA, etc. How is Vol. I progressing up there? Are you near completion?

Best wishes.

CHK

(See CHK 4/14/52)

0351

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Commodore R. W. Bates, USN

DATE: 17 Apr 52

FROM : Kawakami

CHK 4-17-52

SUBJECT:

Herewith translations of three action reports of units of the 653rd Air Gp covering their shore-based operations (from PHILIPPINES) during the LEYTE Battle proper. This polishes off all material for this air group for the whole period of your study.

Please note that, though these reports are for the LEYTE action proper, the 263rd Attack Unit report contains some loss and strength data going back to 14 Oct. See last three pages of translation. This data may be useful to Hartman for the TAIWAN air phase.

Received this morning your letter concerning inquiries which you would like Roger to make while he is in Tokyo. He is just about there by this time, so I will drop him a line and transmit your request. As long as Roger limits his inquiries to the Historical Section, however, I'm afraid that he isn't going to get much new material, especially on the subject of Fourth Air Army operations or the missing Combined Fleet OpOrds. You seem to forget that I spent three years out there trying to find these and a whole lot of other missing documents. So please don't get your hopes up. I will let Roger know exactly what material we

0352

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE:

-2-

FROM :

SUBJECT:

have already, so that Col. Hartman and the Historical Section boys (OHMAE & Company) won't pass off on him the same old materials we already have - Col. SATO's papers, the NACHI documents, etc. They could give Roger all this stuff as new material, and he wouldn't know the difference .

I am also forwarding herewith a corrected copy of the translation of the section of TOYODA's book. Apparently, your yeoman doesn't copyread the typed copies at all, otherwise he would catch the simple typographical errors. I suspect, though, that he has his hands pretty full.

Sincerely,

CHK

*Incls. - 3 Japanese document translations
1 corrected typed translation*

0353

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Commodore R. W. Bates

DATE: 21 Apr 52

FROM : Kawakami

SUBJECT:

Herewith a couple more translations of air documents. The 103rd Attack Unit war diary goes back to the TAIWAN air battle and contains some strength figures which may be helpful to Comdr Hartman.

CHK

(CHK 4-21-52)

0354

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Commodore R. W. Bates, USN

DATE: 25 Apr 52

FROM : Kawakami

SUBJECT:

Herewith translations of a couple more air documents. The war diary of the 203rd Air Gp contains data pertinent to the TAIWAN air battle as well as to subsequent operations in the PHILIPPINES.

Will write to Roger again and transmit your request for the photos. It shouldn't be difficult to obtain them.

Will be awaiting your manuscript with interest. Best wishes.

CHK

0355

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Commodore R. W. Bates

DATE: 30 April 52

FROM : Kawakami

SUBJECT:

Herewith two more translations of air action reports for period after 17 Oct. There are only a couple more action reports to translate, and then we shall have completed all the available air material (exclusive of the reports of the carriers themselves) for the entire period through 25 Oct. The amount of translation has been voluminous. Still, as I previously told you, even this mass of material (since it consists of individual unit reports) falls far short of giving a complete account. There are too many units for which no documents are available. I dread to think of what the translation job would be if we did have documents for the whole works.

I have on hand completed translations of 6FGB and other operations orders for the period after 17 Oct. Will send these along after I have checked them.

Have not heard anything yet from Roger but presume that he is acting on our requests in between numerous 15-cent dry Martinis.

CHK

(CHK 4-30-52)

0356